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Abstract: This paper focuses on investment decisions made by 
microfinance borrowers in Jordan. While there has been a lot of 
literature concentrating on the level of investment after credit access 
was made available, there has been very limited research on the impact 
of Islamic microfinance. The amount of literature comparing Islamic 
financing and its conventional counterpart is even more uncommon. 
This study will look at how conventional and Islamic borrowers differ in 
their decisions pertaining to business investments, home improvement 
projects and consumer durable goods. Results show that microfinance 
loan take-ups do lead to a higher probability of business investments. In 
addition, it is found that the two groups of borrowers do not differ in 
investments regarding their microenterprises, but Islamic borrowers are 
less likely to invest in home improvement projects and purchase 
consumer durables. The findings suggest that there exists a substantial 











The development of microfinance has been crucial in the context of poverty 
alleviation and women empowerment in the developing world. Since its establishment 
in Bangladesh, the program has consistently grown at an exponential rate. In 2011, it is 
reported that around 100 million customers worldwide are borrowing from 10,000 
microfinance institutions (Ahlin et al., 2011). The effects of microfinance on consumers’ 
welfare has been extensively researched; however, several authors argue that 
microfinance has yet to reach its full potential, particularly in delivering credit access to 
the poorest of the poor (Morduch, 1998; Scully, 2004; Coleman, 2006). This is especially 
true in the Middle East, since it is estimated only 1% of the microfinance clients are 
living in this region of the world (Coleman, 2004). The lack of microfinance in the area 
can be explained by the existence of interest rates, or riba, which are charged on 
conventional loans. According to Shari’a Law, riba is strictly prohibited in Islam, 
preventing many people from participating in microcredit. For instance, the 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (2007) shows that the majority of respondents in 
Muslim countries choose not to partake in conventional microfinance practices due to 
religious reasons (El-Komi & Croson, 2011). Thus, Islamic microfinance has been 
introduced as an alternative to traditional lending methods. Due to its recent 
establishment, the practice of Islamic microfinance has not received much attention 
from researchers. Moreover, the literature comparing Islamic financing and its 
conventional counterpart is even more uncommon. This paper focuses on how 
investment decisions differ between conventional and Islamic microfinance borrowers.  
Microfinance in Jordan was first started in the mid-to-late 1990’s and has 
become one of the fastest growing sectors of the country’s economy.  In 2008, the sector 
has 144,232 active clients and a gross portfolio of about $127 million, accounting for 
8.5% of the regional market (Saqfalhait, 2010).  The majority of the microfinance clients 
in Jordan are women, whose financial status and living standards were greatly improved 
by the program.  A large part of microcredit in the country consists of providing loans 
to both individuals and groups for financing existing projects or start-ups.  A few MFI’s 
in the region have also started giving out loans for consumer credit products such as 
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vehicle, education and home improvements (Saqfalhait, 2010). Despite ongoing success 
with the program, the sector is relatively new and still needs further attention from 
policy makers to become accessible to the poor. 
 The survey was conducted over the course of two months in Jordan, from June 
to August 2012. Participants were asked about fundamental events that took place from 
2002 to 2012, pertaining to enterprise investments, home improvements, and consumer 
durables. The indicated time period was constructed based on the microfinance 
institution that the researchers worked with, since the bank was opened in 2006. The 
data analysis was done using a Linear Probability Model (LPM) with region-year fixed-
effects. Standard errors were clustered at the region-year level to correct for the 
heteroskedasticity problem found in earlier versions of the model. The results show that 
there is an increase in the level of investment for business and home improvement 
associated with microfinance loan take-ups. Overall, there are no large discrepancies 
with how conventional and Islamic borrowers spend their loans. In addition, the only 
noticeable difference is that Islamic clients are less likely to purchase consumer durables 
and enroll their children in private schools.  
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Investment: 
  While various studies have found a negative relationship between microfinance 
take-up and poverty (Pitt & Khandker, 1998; Fernando, 2006; Khandker, 1999; 
Chowdhury et al., 2005), others have argued that the impact of microfinance appears to 
be small, particularly in the context of experiments (Coleman, 2006; Karlan & Zinman, 
2009). Still, these studies use different methods of measuring poverty and improvement 
of welfare, including business profits, per capita income, and per capital expenditure. 
For example, Pitt and Khandker (1998) find strong evidence supporting the impact of 
microfinance on consumption smoothing and increase in household income in 
Bangladesh. By utilizing a quasi-experimental setting, annual household consumption 
expenditure was found to increase by 18 percent and 11 percent with a female and male 
borrower, respectively. Although using these measures can prove to be effective, 
Pellegrina (2011) claims that investment level is a better indicator of long-term effects 
of microfinance. In addition, Bage (2004) also argues that focusing on the level and 
types of investment is essential, since participating in productive activities can be seen 
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as the first step toward self-sustainability for low-income families. The practice of 
“unproductive lending” can sometimes drive the borrowers into even more debt, making 
them worse off than they were before (Karlan & Zinman, 2009). Thus, this study will 
concentrate on how borrowers spend their loans toward productivities, with a particular 
focus on business investments and home improvements.  
The theories on the impact of microfinance suggest that investment and 
consumption levels depend heavily on how long it takes for the project returns to be 
realized, as well as how patient the household can be (Banerjee et al., 2010). The theory 
states that if a loan is borrowed to be consumed today, or to be invested in a project that 
will yield immediate returns, then an increase in consumption is found. However, if the 
loan does not yield immediate returns, Banerjee et al. (2010) finds a decrease in 
consumption in addition to an increase in short-term investment. The findings suggest 
that when research is done on the short-term effects of microfinance, only an immediate 
level of investment can be observed. 
Thus, several researchers have focused on the level of investment as a proxy for 
welfare development and found significant impact. Using a randomized experiment to 
evaluate the impact of microfinance on investment in Morroco, Crepon et al. (2011) find 
that significantly more businesses were launched after microfinance was made available 
in the region.  The purchases of durables, especially business durables, were also found 
to increase. However, the effect is only found on already existing activities, since no new 
businesses were opened after microfinance was made available to the region. These 
results suggest that microfinance does have a substantial impact on business-level 
outcomes. Nevertheless, it does not lead to a miraculous transformation of social 
conditions, as some literature has suggested. Rajbanshi et al. (2012) find similar results 
in Nepal by looking at the history of the household’s investments. Although credit 
availability appeared to have no significant impact on the purchase of new machinery or 
land, it was found to have a positive correlation with the purchase of livestock and new 
physical retail space. Similarly, according to Karlan and Zimman’s (2009) experimental 
study in Manila, which offers credit access to households previously rejected for a loan, 
there was little or no evidence supporting the increase in profits and business expansion. 
Correspondingly, using the same dataset with follow-up surveys from Pitt and Khanker 
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(1998), Morduch and Roodman (2009) find no significant impact of microfinance on 
welfare.   
On the other hand, other studies have found contradictory results on the impact 
of microfinance. For example, Banerjee et al. (2010) find a significant effect of 
microfinance loans on the expansion of existing businesses, along with an increase in 
profitability and creation of new enterprises. Conducted using a randomized control 
trial in India, the study discovered that existing business owners were more likely to 
increase their purchase of durable goods, and consequently become more profitable. 
Despite these results, the authors find that those with low predicted propensity to start 
a business do not increase their durables spending, but choose to focus more on 
nondurable consumption instead. Other studies have also found that borrowers often 
invest in home improvement projects after the take-up of microfinance loans. For 
example, Berhane and Gardebroek (2011) learn that after the second round of 
borrowing, there is a positive and significant effect of microloans on housing 
improvement. The data were collected through a four-round panel survey on farm 
households in northern Ethiopia. It is estimated that borrowers are 46% more likely to 
invest in a major housing upgrade than non-borrowers in the sample. Since home 
improvement is a long-term investment, it is an indicator of welfare improvement of 
poor households. Similarly, McIntosh et al. (2011) attain the same results in India, 
Ghana, and Guatemala, where the probability of a major housing upgrade increases by 
3.2% in the years after the take-up of microfinance loans. They also found that in the 
year the household takes out credit, the probability of business investments nearly 
triples from 8.1 to 20.9 percentage points (McIntosh et al., 2011). 
Despite extensive research on the subject, the question on whether microfinance 
actually improves the level of investment of durables for its participant still remains 
ambiguous. Furthermore, there has been virtually no research comparing the effects of 
conventional microfinance to its Islamic counterpart. Therefore, looking at the 
investment decisions of the two types of borrowers crucial in the development of 
lending to the poor, especially in the Middle East.  
2.2 Islamic Microfinance 
In order to understand the structure of Islamic microfinance, it is important to 
look at the principles and instruments of the practice.  The philosophy of Islamic 
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microfinance is based mainly on four principles of Shari’a Law: the prohibition of 
interest rates, risk-sharing, calculation of time-value of money, and the prohibition of 
taking excessive risk (El-Komi & Croson, 2011).  The first principle, the prohibition of 
riba or interest rates, is the most important reason for low penetration rates in the 
Middle East (and North Africa). The Qur’an has explicitly stated this in Alle Imran: 
130, 
Devour not riba, doubled and multiplied; but fear Allah; that ye may (really) prosper. 
The second principle, risk-sharing is promoted so that lenders and borrowers share the 
profits and losses during good and bad times (El-Komi & Croson, 2011). These two 
principles, when combined, mark significant reasons as to how Islamic and conventional 
microfinance differ. The third principle explains the motive behind the prohibition of 
riba, in that money can only be used as a medium of exchange as long as it is not 
invested in unproductive activities. The final principle prohibits Gharar, otherwise 
known as the practice of taking excessive risks, or taking part in speculative behaviors 
such as gambling (El-Komi & Croson, 2011).   	  
There are several methods employed by microfinance institutions when lending 
to their clients. One of the most popular Islamic methods is the murabaha contract, 
where a product is sold to the borrower from the bank with an agreed markup price.  
Payments are often made in installments for a specific period of time (El-Komi & 
Croson, 2011). By utilizing this payment method, the financier must directly obtain the 
goods which will be given to the entrepreneur, eliminating the possibility of the 
borrower using the loan for alternative purposes (El-Komi & Croson, 2011). Murabaha 
has also been praised for being more effective than other methods employed by Islamic 
MFIs. Overall, this model is more cost-effective, has a lower margin of error, and 
provides immediate collateral for a MFI because the institution owns the goods until 
the last installment is paid (Akhter et al., 2009). It is also most suitable for working 
capital financing and fixed asset purchased project financing (Dusuki, 2008).   
There are currently two studies that explicitly focus on the comparison of 
Islamic and traditional interest-based loans. El-Komi & Croson (2011) looked at this 
issue by developing an experiment with interest-based loan contracts (conventional) and 
profit-sharing contracts (Islamic). They find that compliance rates are significantly 
higher in the Islamic-compliant contracts than in the interest contract. Women are also 
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found to comply more than men; and moreover, religiosity is found to be positively 
correlated with compliance rates. From the results of the experiment, one can conclude 
that Islamic and conventional financing methods attract different types of borrowers, 
mainly based on their level of religiosity.  
In order to test what method of financing microfinance clients would prefer, El-
Gamal et al. (2012) propose an Islamically accepted model built on the rotating savings 
and credit association (ROSCA) scheme. The program was tested against the traditional 
interest-based loaning method in a “laboratory experiment in the field,” using poor 
Egyptian households as their subjects. The authors find that take-up rates for the 
ROSCA design were 16% higher than the traditional “Grameen-style” method (91% 
compare to 75%). Overall, the ROSCA treatment was also found to have a statistically 
significant effect on both take-up and repayment rates, suggesting that subjects prefer 
this method of financing.  
The conceptual framework of microfinance fully supports the social 
transformation results that many practitioners have claimed.  However, studies differ 
greatly in their findings on impact evaluations through microfinance, and conventional 
microfinance is still inaccessible to one of the biggest poor populations in the world. It is 
estimated that about one-third of the world’s poor is Muslim (El-Komi & Croson, 2011), 
and thus cannot take advantage of the current conventional microfinance banking 
system. Therefore, the development of Islamic microfinance could play a crucial role in 
poverty alleviation. The nature of Islamic microfinance itself differs significantly from 
that of conventional practices, introducing a new method of lending in the market. In 
addition, Islamic borrowers are also expected to be more religious and thus would self-
select out of the conventional banking system due to the prohibition of usury in Islam.  
It is important to consider if the difference in the borrowers themselves would also lead 
to a fluctuation in the types of investment. This study focuses on two aspects of 
investment in microfinance. First, it is designed to look at whether Islamic and 
conventional invest in different types of businesses, and if so, whether one group spends 
more on those investments or not. Certainly, observing investment decisions in Jordan 




3.1 Microfinance Institutions and Areas of Survey 
The research was conducted in Jordan over the course of two months, from June 
to August 2012. The data were collected primarily in the operating areas of National 
Microfinance Bank (NMB), a Jordanian private shareholding not-for-profit company. 
Established in March 2006, the bank opened three branches in Karak, Zarqa and 
Wehdat along with the disbursement of its first loan. NMB was founded based on a 
partnership between King Abdullah II Fund for Development, the Arab Gulf Program 
for Development (AGFUND), and two private sector investors. The organization’s 
main goal is to target the poor by significantly increasing the productivity of the 
existing micro and macro entrepreneurs, with the primary focus on women. The 
institution only utilizes a direct-lending method and does not offer group lending.  
In total, the bank operates in 11 branches in the country: Baqa’a, Deir Alla, Irbid, 
Karak, Madaba, Marka, Salt, Wehdat, Zarqa, Mafaq, and West Amman. Information on 
clients residing in the Mafraq area was not collected due to construction issues. The 
branches are located in 8 regions of the country. 
 One of the bank’s main goals is to provide sufficient and reliable services, thus 
the MFI aims to simplify its procedure so that their clients can receive their loans 
within 24 hours. In addition, five conventional and Islamic loan products are designed 
to meet each of the client’s needs. The values of the loans range from 200 to 25000JD 
(~282 – 2531USD). In addition, the institution offers several loan products, including 
educational, health, home-improvement, purchase of durable goods, and home-based 
business loans. Since any loan over 3500JD (~4943USD) requires the business owner to 
have an operating license, this research focuses primarily on home-based business loans 
under the capped amount. Although NMB offers both conventional and Islamic methods 
of financing, the number of Islamic borrowers is actually very small. Thus, the 
researchers partnered with another MFI to gather information on Islamic clients.  
 The sample of Islamic loan borrowers was taken from the Development 
Employment Fund (DEF), a public governmental establishment. DEF was founded in 
1989, currently operating with twelve branches in the nation. These branches are 
located in Amman, Mafaq, Ajlun, Jarash, Ma’an, Tafailah, Karak, Irbid, Zarqa, Balqa, 
Madaba, and Aqaba.  In order to meet each of its client’s specific needs, DEF provides 
both conventional and Islamic microfinancing methods. Both NMB and DEF only offer 
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banking services and are not involved with entrepreneurial or management training. 
Since the sample of conventional and Islamic borrowers is taken from two different 
operating banks, the main concern is the inherent heterogeneity between the groups. 
Fittingly, the eligibility requirements for the two institutions are the same: to be 
eligible to receive a loan, the borrower must live in the same region as one of the 
branches. Specifically, a borrower must (1) be a Jordanian citizen or legal resident who 
can provide the bank with a Jordanian guarantor, (2) be at least 18 years and not exceed 
65 years of age at the last installment due date, (3) have a legal financing purpose, (4) 
have a good reputation, and (5) be willing and able to provide the bank with the 
minimum personal guarantees as requested for each product. 
3.2 Survey Methodology and Data Description 
 The data on conventional borrowers were collected in the cities of Karak, Zarqa, 
Wehdat, Baquaa, Salt, Marka, Madaba, and Irbid (Wehdat, Marka are in Amman). 
Islamic borrowers were randomly selected in the branches of Amman, Irbid, Karak, 
Madaba, and Zarqa. These branches were chosen so that they can be matched up against 
the conventional borrowers in the sample.  
 In order to look at the type and level of investment a borrower tends to make, an 
event-study methodology called Retrospective Analysis of Fundamental Events 
Contiguous to Treatment (RETRAFECT) was utilized. The method was developed by 
Rajbanshi et al. (2012) for the purpose of analyzing the discrepancy between the claims 
of large microfinance impact by development practitioners and the far smaller impacts 
found in experimental studies. Under this method, only a single cross-sectional survey 
was needed to create a retrospective panel dataset of the history of the household. The 
technique offers various benefits to the researchers, since impact evaluation can be 
undertaken ex-post, with no firm requirement for a specific control group. However, 
RETRAFECT also calls for a rigid set of requirements. Fittingly, our study fits in the 
framework. Specifically, the program has existed for a number of years (DEF was 
established in 1989 whille NMB was opened in 2006). Moreover, microfinance 
programs have also been phased over time in different regions, along with a stable 
population with little geographical movement. Thus, it can be concluded that 
RETRAFECT was appropriate for this study. 
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During the survey period, the enumerators were trained to ask the participants 
about fundamental events that took place during the period of 2002 to 2012. Such 
events include investment in businesses (purchase of new machinery, inventory or 
livestock, expansion to the store space, and hiring of new employees), home 
improvement projects (new bedrooms, walls, or a major floor or toilet upgrade), and the 
purchases of major consumer goods (a new TV, stove, car, air conditioning/fan unit, or 
fridge). These events will then be recorded in discrete terms, either taking a value of 0’s 
or 1’s, with a value of 0 indicating the absence of such investments and 1 otherwise. 
Since the event window is rather long (11 years), extra measures were undertaken to 
ensure the accuracy of the participants’ responses. Under the circumstance that the 
subjects cannot remember the exact year of the event, other major incidents in the 
households were recalled to help them remember. These events include childbirth, 
marriage or the hospitalization of a family member. By matching the investment events 
with these memorable episodes, we were able to minimize the error associated with 
asking subjects to recall past incidents.  
The sample constitutes 223 households; 145 of which are conventional 
borrowers, while 78 are Islamic borrowers. Females make up the majority of the 
interviewed participants, as they represent 76.2% of the sample. While most 
conventional borrowers are female (93.1%), the majority of the Islamic borrowers are 
males (55.1%). This is due the fact that NMB exclusively targets women, while DEF 
does not. Level of education varies within the sample, with the majority having finished 
secondary school (10 years of schooling) and high school (12 years of schooling); these 
two categories amount for 67% of the subjects. The educational attainment level 
remains relatively consistent between the two groups, with most of the participants 
having finished secondary school or high school. However, the Islamic borrowers in the 
sample seem to have a higher level of education, with 15% having completed a four-year 
bachelor degree, while only 6% of the conventional counterparts have. 58.89% of the 
participants are unemployed, while 24.11% of them are working full-time on their 
project. The households exhibit similar economic status, as the reported mean monthly 
income is 415JD (~586USD), ranging from 90JD to 2550JD  (~127 - 3600USD) per 
month. There is not much discrepancy between the two groups, as mean monthly 
income is 427.3JD (~603USD) for conventional borrowers and 399.9JD(~565USD) for 
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the Islamic group. 51.35% of all the households in the sample have a business, while the 
rest do not. The average size of a household is 5.8, with the smallest family having 1 
person and the biggest family consisting of 6 persons.  
While the current loan size of our conventional clients range 150 to 3500JD 
(~211 – 4140USD), with a mean of 620JD (~875USD), Islamic borrowers have a much 
larger portfolio, ranging from 300 to 3500JD (~423USD), with a mean of 1439.5JD 
(~2032USD). Although the data set consists of several socioeconomic characteristics 
such as: household income, current loan sizes, the number of family members… these 
are collected with a cross sectional survey. Thus, this information was not used for 
running a panel regression1 
Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables and the control variables are 
given in table 1A, 1B, and 1C. 
 
Table 1B describes the normalized summary statistics for fundamental events. 
Overall, around 38 percent of the sample have purchased some type of business durable 
goods, while 51 percent have invested in a major home improvement project, and about 
70 percent of them have bought a major consumer good. Table 1B has also found that 
around 20 percent of the participants have sent their children to private school during 
the indicated time period. The variable private school was included as a dependent 
variable because it represents social and long-term investments, rather than physical 
capital investments. Especially in Jordan, where public school is free and mandatory for 
the first 10 years of education, the enrollment of children in private school indicates an 
investment in future generations. 
 Table 3 compares the summary statistics between the two types of borrowers. 
Overall, we do not see much discrepancy between the two groups. However, a two-
tailed T-test shows that conventional borrowers are more likely to purchase new 
inventory, do a major floor upgrade, and buy various types of consumer durable goods.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The limitations of this research will be discussed later in the paper 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation
All business investment 0.38 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.35 0.48
All home improvement 0.51 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.39 0.49
All home durable goods 0.70 0.46 0.74 0.44 0.64 0.48
Private School 0.22 0.42 0.25 0.44 0.17 0.38
Sample Conventional Borrower Islamic Borrowers
Table 1B: Normalized Summary Statistics for Fundamental Events
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3.3 Empirical Model 
The model is calculated using a Linear Probability Model with a region-year 
fixed-effects.  An LP model is preferred since the probability of the listed fundamental 
events are rather low, thus the likelihood of the predicted values fall outside the range of 
0 and 1 is low as well (Rajbanshi, 2012).  Moreover, when flat panel datasets are used 
with fixed-effects estimation, more robust estimates are produced with an LP model 
(Chamberlin, 1979). There are two types of borrowers in the regression: conventional 
and Islamic; thus, a dummy variable indicating the type of loans they took out was 
included.  Regional and year fixed-effects are included in the regression to account for 
the composite error problem existed in panel data.   The model estimates the following: 
𝑌!"# = 𝛼!" + 𝐵𝑋′!! + 𝛽!"𝐶!" + 𝜀!"#!!!!!!!!  
 
Variable 𝑌!"# represents the fundamental event with a value of 1 indicating that 
the event occurs for household i living in city j at time t (in this case, a business 
investment, home improvement project, purchase of household durables, or private 
school enrollment).  The independent variables consist of the appropriate fixed-effect 
levels, 𝛼!", a vector of control variables, X’, and the event window of 5 years. Here 𝑡 
represents the year of the participant obtaining the loan, and k represents the window of 
2 years before and after take-up. Two types of models were employed in the results: a 
region fixed-effects and a region-year fixed-effects model. The control variables include 
a dummy variable for the sex of the participants, age, the squared of age, a female 
dummy, the number of children in the household under the age of 11, and the Islamic 
borrower dummy. Robust standard errors at the region-year level were included to 
correct for heteroskedasticity within the sample.  
The hypotheses tested are as follows: 
Ho: Investments do not increase in the year of microfinance loan take-up 
Ha: Investment do increase in the year of microfinance loan take-up 
And: 
Ho: There is no significant difference between the types of investment that 
conventional and Islamic borrowers tend to make. 
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Ha: There is a significant difference between the types of investments that 
conventional and Islamic borrowers tend to make. 
4. Results: Different Uses of Microfinance Loans 
4.1  Model 1: Region fixed-effects 
 The results are presented in several table and graphs, including tables 2A to 2C, 
3-4 and figures 2A to 2D.  
Table 2A represents the change of probability of business investments a 
household would make, including the purchase of a new machinery, expansion of the 
store space, a large purchase in inventory, new livestock, or hiring of new employees. 
From the regression table, we can conclude that the year of microfinance take-up is 
highly significant for the purchase of new machinery and any type of business 
investments, at 5%  and 10% levels, respectively. It is predicted that during the year of 
take-up, the probability of a household buying new machines for their business increases 
by 4.2 percentage points. On the other hand, the probability of any business investment 
would increase by 6.9 percentage points during the year of take-up. It is also predicted 
that during the second year after loan take-up, there is an increase in the probability of 
the households buying large supplies of inventory for their stores. The results are 
similar for any type of business investment, where the probability increases by 7.7 
percentage points in the 2 years after taking out a loan. These findings indicate that 
borrowers are most likely investing in their businesses with their loans, and then 
deciding to increase their inventory stock once their income has risen. The variable of 
interest here is the Islamic dummy, which is non-significant and near zero for all 
dependent variables. Thus, it is suggested that there does not exist a different between 
how conventional and Islamic borrowers spend their loans. The conclusion here is 
consistent with the practice of Islamic microfinance, where clients are only using their 
loans on their microenterprises. 
 Table 2B displays the results for home improvement projects. Although it is 
established that Islamic borrowers can only use their loans on business investments, we 
are assuming that by taking out a loan, it promotes the ease of other investments. In 
other words, money is freed up for other uses and investments. Contrary to previous 
results, it is shown here that the year of take-up is insignificant in explaining the 
probability of a household making an investment related to the building of a new 
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bedroom, major walls, floor, and toilet upgrade. The year of take-up is significant for the 
variables of other and any home improvement projects. However, the probability is 
rather small (3.2 and 4.3 percentage points for other home improvement projects and 
any project, respectively). When comparing the coefficient for the year of take-up and 
the year before, no substantial difference is observed for any type of improvement 
project. Thus, we can conclude that in the year of loan take-up, there is no significant 
increase for the probability of home improvement. However, it is observed that during 
the second year after the first microloan, the probability of other and any home 
improvement projects increases by 11.5 and 12.5 percentage points, respectively. These 
results are highly significant at the 1% and 5% levels, suggesting a lag effect of 
microfinance loans. In other words, most households would wait for their income to 
increase and then start investing on home improvements. This is a reasonable 
assumption since many have speculated that the long-term effects of microfinance would 
not be recognized until a few years later. On the other hand, the Islamic borrower 
dummy coefficient is not significant for any variables, suggesting that there is no 
difference within home improvement preferences between conventional and Islamic 
clients. The results can be explained along with the previous models, where we find that 
most borrowers would tend to invest in their businesses when they receive their loans, 
and then do a major home upgrade once their income level has increased. 
For the category of consumer durable goods, we observed that during the year 
of take-up, there is no significant increase in the probability of any investments. 
However, we can see that in the one year after a loan has been received, there is an 
indication of increase in the purchase of any consumer durables. The results also 
indicate a lagged effect in microfinance, where consumption on durable goods is 
increased in the years after credit availability. In particular, the study found that the 
probability of a household buying any type of consumer durable good is 6.2 percentage 
points higher. The Islamic borrower dummy variable is significant as well, suggesting 
that a small variance exists between the types of investment Islamic and conventional 
borrowers make. Specifically, Islamic borrowers are 3.9 percentage points less likely to 
purchase any major consumer goods. 
So far, we have not seen any major discrepancies between the types of 
investments that conventional and Islamic borrowers tend to make after their loan take-
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up. The findings suggest that even with different methods of financing and principles 
that the two models are based upon, we continue to see consistencies regarding the 
investment decisions of the borrowers. However, we have only looked at the decisions 
regarding physical capital level investments, and have ignored other types of 
investments that could potentially improve the living conditions of the subjects. Thus, 
in the next regression, we will look at the probability of children going to private school 
after the take-up of a microfinance loan in a household.  
The socioeconomic effects of microfinance are measured in table 3, represented 
by the probability of children being enrolled in private school before and after the take-
up of microfinance loans. We found that the take-up of microfinance loans does not 
increases the probability of children enrolled in private school. The variable age is 
significant at the 1% level as well, suggesting that older parents are more likely to put 
their children in private schools. The female variable is found to have a statistically 
insignificant impact on the probability of children going to private school. This 
conclusion contradicts earlier literature, which often posits that women show a stronger 
preference for educating their children (Behrman & Rosenzweig, 2002). The dummy 
variable for Islamic borrower is also insignificant, suggesting that the type of loan a 
household takes out does not have any effects on private schooling. Overall, these 
estimates are consistent with what we have found earlier. Thus, we can conclude that 
both conventional and Islamic borrowers tend to use their loans toward physical capital 
and long-term investments. 
4.2  Model 2: Region – Year Fixed-Effects Model 
The region fixed-effects model suggests that microfinance would lead to a 
higher probability in all types of investments; however, the probabilities are relatively 
inconsistent and thus the results are rather erratic. Furthermore, a region fixed-effects 
model is not reliable since it does not take into account the time factor. For example, 
while participants are more likely to remember events in recent years than what 
happened 10 years ago, a region-year fixed-effects model will be to eliminate the 
endogeneity problem during the event window. Second, a the region-year model can 
also be used as a tool to better differentiate the effects of microfinance and other factors 
influencing investment decisions in Jordan, such as overall better economic conditions 
in Jordan. The results of the model are presented in Tables 4A-D.  
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 The results of region-year fixed-effects model on business-level outcomes are 
presented in Table 4A. Specifically, it is observed that during the year of microfinance 
take-up, the probabilities of a household purchasing new machinery and any business 
investment are highly significant at the 1% level. The results hold for any type of 
business investments as well, suggesting that microfinance borrowers are putting their 
loans toward productive activities, such as investing in their microenterprises. The 
signs are positive as expected, showing that investments do increase once a client has 
taken out a loan. Overall, there is a 3.7 percentage points increase in the probability of 
business investment during the year of take-up. The results also show that one year 
after the household has received a loan, the probability of them buying large quantity of 
inventory actually decreases, significant at the 1% level. In particular, microfinance 
borrowers are 4.3 percentage points less likely to purchase new inventory the year after 
take-up. The model also indicates that female entrepreneurs are less likely to purchase 
livestock and hire new employees. The coefficients suggest that female participants are 
more interested in using their loans on other types of investments. The variable of 
interest is the Islamic dummy variable, which is negative and significant for increased in 
the purchase of inventory, livestock, and any business investment. In particular, Islamic 
borrowers are 2.5 percentage points less likely to invest in their businesses. The results 
might seem puzzling at first, since Islamic loans can only be used for business-level 
purposes, and the goods are obtained directly from the microfinance institutions. 
However, the negative sign in all business investment is due to the differences in 
increased in new inventory and livestock for the two types of borrowers. Specifically, 
Islamic borrowers are 1.4 and 0.6 percentage points less likely to purchase inventory 
and livestock. The results are reasonable since these types of goods are perishable, and 
thus cannot be leased out through a microfinance institution. Thus we can conclude that 
for the types of goods that a MFI would lend to an Islamic borrowers, there is no 
observed differences within business investments. Age is also found to be positively 
correlated with the level of investment, suggesting that older participants are more 
likely to put their loans toward productive activities. Overall, female participants are 
found to be less inclined to invest in their businesses. This suggests that female 
borrowers are more concerned with using their loans toward other types of activities.  
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Table 4B shows the regression results for the Linear Probability model on Home 
Improvement Projects. Overall, the results do not display any trend in home 
improvement investments before and after loan take-up. The table shows that one year 
after the take-up of a loan, a household is actually decreasing their level of toilet 
upgrade. Thus, we can conclude that when taking the averages of the years, there is no 
correlation between microfinance and the probability of home improvement projects. 
The age of the participant is also positive and significant, indicating them older 
borrowers are more worried about their living conditions than younger participants. 
The Islamic dummy variable is insignificant at every level of home improvement, except 
for the any home improvement variable. The results suggest that Islamic borrowers are 
less likely to invest their homes as their conventional counterparts. The findings are in 
accordance with the theory of Islamic banking, where Islamic loans can only be used for 
business investments. The female dummy variable here is significant for new walls, 
suggesting that female borrowers are less likely to invest in new walls.  
            The results for consumer durable goods greatly differ from what we found in the 
region fixed-effects model (Table 4C). Specifically, there is no significant increase in the 
probability of investment during or after the year of loan take-up. Moreover, the results 
show that during the year of take-up, the probability of the household investing in 
consumer durables other than a new television, fridge, car, stove, or air conditioning 
unit decreases by 2.8 percentage points. Thus we can conclude that once the time-
constant unobserved effect is eliminated, the increased in the level of investment for 
consumer durable goods observed in the previous models disappear. The results suggest 
that these observed increase in the purchase is due to better economic conditions overall 
in Jordan, not because of microfinance. The coefficient of the age variable for the 
purchase of a new TV, fridge and any consumer durable goods are also positive and 
significant at the 5% and 10% levels, indicating that older borrowers are more inclined 
to invest in the purchase of household durables. The Islamic dummy variable is shown 
to be significant and negative for other and any consumer durable goods, which means 
that Islamic borrowers are less likely to invest in these types of assets. In particular, 
Islamic borrowers are 3.0 percentage points less likely to purchase any type of 
consumer durables. 
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The regression on the variable private school is consistent with what we have 
found in the region fixed-effects model. In particular, we find that during and after the 
year of take-up, there is no association between microfinance and the enrollment of 
children in private schools. This is due to the fact that if a borrower wanted to put their 
children in a private school, he or she would have done so with or without microfinance. 
Second, the age of the participant is highly significant, implying that other parents care 
more about their children’s education. The table also suggests that older and more 
educated participants are more likely to enroll their children in a private institution. 
The Islamic variable is insignificant, suggesting that Islamic borrowers are as likely to 
put their children in private school. Overall, we do not see any effects of microfinance on 
private school enrollment.  
These estimates can be further examined by looking at the graphs presented by 
figures 2-5. The x-axis plots the years before and after the take-up of a microfinance 
loan, and the y-axis represents the value of the point estimates, as well as the lower and 
higher 95% confidence intervals.  
For business investments (Figure 2A), we see a consistent upward trend in the 
years before loan take-up and a downward trend right after. This could be explained by 
that the fact that many took out loans simply just to invest in their businesses. The next 
graph, 2B, shows that there is no correlation between microfinance take-up and the 
probability of home improvements. For consumer durable goods (Figure 2C), the results 
are very similar: there exists no consistent trend in the years before and after the year 
the households receive a loan. Lastly, the probability of children enrolling in private 
school seems to be very sporadic (Figure 2D). We can see that there are no effects of 
microfinance on private school enrollment. Thus, one might argue that enrollment 
could potentially be explained by a change in household economic status overall, not 
because of the take-up of microfinance loans. 
4.3  Robustness Check: Household-Level Fixed-Effects 
As a robustness check, we performed a household-level fixed-effects model on 
business investments. Overall, even when taking into account a household’s average 
propensity to invest in their enterprises, the results show significant and positive 
increase in new machinery purchase in the year of take-up. In particular, households are 
4.3 percentage points more likely to invest in new machinery in the year of loan receipt. 
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Thus, even when we control for the average likelihood of buying new machinery, there 
is still a significant relationship between microfinance and business investments. 
4.4  Model with Interaction Terms 
 Additional results are presented in Table 7, showing an LP model with region-
year fixed-effects on selected investments. The main difference with this table is that 
interaction terms for the leads and lags and the Islamic dummy variable are included in 
the regression. In particular, we see that Islamic borrowers are less likely to purchase 
any business durables, as well as other consumer durable goods. However, the table 
shows that in the year of loan take-up, Islamic participants are only less likely to invest 
in a major floor upgrade or purchase consumer durables. These results are consistent 
with the theory of Islamic microfinance, since Islamic loans can only be used for 
business purposes. However, the table does demonstrate some very interesting results. 
Most notably, we observe that in the two years after loan receipt, Islamic borrowers are 
6.6 percentage points more likely to purchase an air conditioning unit and 12.7 
percentage points more likely to buy any consumer good. The differences indicate a 
lagged effect of microfinance for Islamic borrowers in particular, where they might be 
doing better in the years after the take-up of microfinance. 
6. Discussion 
The paper focuses on the impact of microfinance on investment decisions in 
Jordan, particularly in the regions that the National Microfinance Bank of Jordan is 
currently operating. The information on conventional and Islamic borrowers was 
collected to explore the impact of microcredit loans on their decision to invest in 
business development, home improvement projects, or purchases of consumer goods. A 
linear probability model is used to estimate the overall probability of these events; 
robust-cluster standard errors were utilized to correct for heteroskedasticity. Two 
methods of fixed-effects estimation were used; however, the region-year fixed-effects 
model yields a more reliable set of results. 
Overall, it is observed that there is an increase in the probability of investment 
during the years of microfinance take-up. In particular, the probability of business 
investments increase by 3.7 percentage points during the year of loan receipt. The 
results indicate that borrowers are putting their loans toward productive activities. On 
the other hand, we do not find any relationship between microfinance take-up and the 
20	  
level of home improvement and consumer durable investments. The model shows that 
microfinance borrowers are diverting funds away from consumption toward business 
investments. The results found in this study are consistent with Rajbanshi et al. (2012) 
and McIntosh et al. (2011), which find that during the year of credit take-up, there is a 
significant and large impact of microcredit on several areas of enterprise investment. 
Our study is also very consistent with Rajbanshi et al. (2012) since there is no observed 
increased in the probability of home improvements and consumer durables after loan 
take-up. This suggests that microloan does lead to significant increase in income and 
consumption. As a result, we can conclude that investments do increase with 
microfinance availability. On the other hand, the study is very different from that of 
Rajbanshi et al. (2012): while Rajbanshi et al. (2012) focuses on smaller loans sizes, 
averaging to US$192, the subjects in our study have an average loan size of $1386. 
While the effects found in our study seem to be small, they are larger than those found 
in experimental studies (Karlan & Zinman, 2009; Morduch & Roodman, 2009). 
In addition, the model did not find a difference in the type of investments that 
conventional and Islamic borrowers tend to make. While conventional borrowers are 
1.9 percentage points more likely to invest in any business project, they are also found 
to be more likely to purchase consumer durables. However, these results tend to be 
pretty inconsistent and thus should be treated with caution when taken into 
consideration. For example, the reason why the probability for business investments is 
lower is due to purchase of inventory and livestock, the types of investments that MFI’s 
cannot provide to Islamic borrowers. The lower probability in consumer durables is 
reasonable since Islamic borrowers are only using their loans on business investments.  
While the study does offer new perspectives on the way borrowers in Jordan 
spend their loans, there exist several shortcomings within the model. First, since the 
study was only conducted over the course of two months, with the panel data collected 
from a single cross-sectional survey, the researchers could not control for several 
aspects of the subjects. For example, a history of household income and loan sizes was 
impossible to collect. Being able to control for income and loan sizes would allow the 
research to be able to differentiate the magnitude of investments and the economic 
status of the subjects. Since only the current loan size and income information was 
available, the results from the panel dataset would have been different if these controls 
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were included in the regression. Second, a possible source of bias could come from the 
fact that the two types of borrowers come from two different MFI’s. The bias is 
minimized since the two institutions have the same eligibility requirements. However, 
the ideal case is where the information of two types of borrowers is gathered from the 
same institution. Lastly, the survey was conducted before and during the holy month of 
Ramadan, where one third of the borrowers were interviewed before Ramadan and the 
rest during. Since Ramadan represents a period of time of fasting and intense religious 
practice, the behavior of the participants could be different from a normal time period.  
 Yet, despite these limitations, we can still observe a substantial effect of 
microfinance. Moreover, since the effects are still in place when controlling for time-
constant unobserved endogeneity, the subjects in the study do exhibit better living 
standards once microfinance was made available. In summary, the large and significant 
increase in probability of enterprise investment is a good indication how microfinance is 
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New machinery 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.12 -0.10
Expansion 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08 -0.91
Increased in inventory*** 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.08 2.63***
Purchase of livestock 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.05 1.01
Hiring of new employee 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08 -0.38
Any Business Investment 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.20 1.15
New bedrooms 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.07 1.02
Walls 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08 -0.38
Major floor upgrade* 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.06 1.79*
Major toilet upgrade 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.09 0.90
Other household improvement* 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.16 1.67*
Any Home Improvement* 0.05 0.23 0.04 0.19 1.92*
TV 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18 0.06
Fridge 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.16 0.97
Car 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.12 -1.14
Stove 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.12 0.76
Air conditioning/Fan unit 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.12 0.47
Other household purchases* 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.14 1.66*
Any Consumer durable goods 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.27 1.57
Private School 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.27 1.53
Control Variables
Age of Participant 31.39 9.85 32.57 10.69 0.143
Age Squared
Female Dummy*** 0.93 0.26 0.45 0.50 9.51***
Islamic Dummy
Education 2.85 1.31 3.13 1.48 -1.4515
Credit Availability 0.64 0.48 0.71 0.45 -3.8546***
Children under 6 0.75 0.88 0.69 0.90 0.80
Children between 6 - 11** 0.84 0.99 0.72 1.01 2.42**
Two-tailed T Tests
Islamic BorrowersConventional Borrowers
Table 1C: Summary Statistics for Conventional and Islamic Borrowers
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2 years before 0.010 0.011 -0.028*** -0.006* 0.010 -0.009
(0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.003) (0.011) (0.009)
1 year before 0.033*** -0.005* -0.006 -0.006* 0.009 0.018
(0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.015)
Year of take-up 0.042** 0.025 0.008 0.009 -0.003 0.069*
(0.016) (0.020) (0.015) (0.008) (0.003) (0.033)
1 year after 0.010 0.020 -0.005 0.002 0.001 0.021
(0.013) (0.015) (0.020) (0.006) (0.009) (0.038)
2 years after 0.017 0.007 0.055* 0.005 -0.008** 0.077*
(0.012) (0.015) (0.024) (0.014) (0.003) (0.033)
Age of participant 0.003*** 0.001 0.001 0.002** 0.001* 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
Age squared -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Islamic Dummy 0.000 0.002 -0.016 -0.006 -0.007 -0.022
(0.007) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.011) (0.022)
Female Dummy -0.012 -0.006 0.003 -0.007 -0.016 -0.025
(0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.020)
Education 0.004** 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.002* 0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Number of children 
(<6) 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.000 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005)
Number of children 
in school (6-11) -0.002 -0.004** -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.009**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Credit Availability 0.000 0.005* 0.022** 0.002 0.002 0.032***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006)
Constant -0.044*** -0.011 -0.011 -0.020 -0.009 -0.090***
(0.012) (0.006) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.023)
Observations 2,398 2,398 2,398 2,398 2,398 2,398
R-squared 0.020 0.014 0.022 0.009 0.011 0.036
Number of branch 8 8 8 8 8 8
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1


























2 years before 0.007 0.004 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.007
(0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.019) (0.020)
1 year before -0.010*** 0.011 0.016 0.009 0.032 0.035*
(0.001) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) (0.025) (0.020)
Year of take-up 0.006 0.009 0.008 0.005 0.032* 0.043***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.015) (0.016)
1 year after 0.016 0.012 0.001 -0.016*** 0.008 0.037*
(0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.012) (0.021)
2 years after 0.003 -0.004 0.030 0.022 0.119** 0.128***
(0.010) (0.003) (0.018) (0.019) (0.035) (0.025)
Age of participant -0.000 0.002** 0.001* 0.002 -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Age squared 0.000 -0.000** -0.000** -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Islamic Dummy -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.010
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.015) (0.012)
Female Dummy -0.004 -0.013*** -0.000 -0.006 -0.003 -0.012
(0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.011) (0.012)
Education -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Number of 
children (<6) 0.003 0.004* 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.012**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005)
Number of 
children in school 
(6-11) -0.003* 0.001 0.002 -0.000 -0.005* -0.006
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Credit Availability 0.007** -0.000 0.003 0.006 0.025*** 0.031***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.011)
Constant 0.013 -0.012 -0.016* -0.021 0.018 0.010
(0.018) (0.007) (0.009) (0.018) (0.031) (0.045)
Observations 2,365 2,365 2,365 2,365 2,343 2,365
R-squared 0.008 0.011 0.012 0.008 0.028 0.033
Number of branch 8 8 8 8 8 8
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES








2 years before -0.027** -0.025 -0.001 -0.178 -0.025*** -0.038** -0.077***
(0.011) (0.020) (0.010) (0.151) (0.006) (0.012) (0.016)
1 year before -0.028*** -0.003 -0.002 -0.178 -0.002 -0.000 -0.011
(0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.156) (0.013) (0.029) (0.026)
Year of take-up 0.018 0.013 0.006 1.067 -0.006 -0.001 0.034
(0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (1.074) (0.011) (0.016) (0.026)
1 year after -0.003 0.016 0.007 -0.134 0.007 0.009 0.062***
(0.021) (0.029) (0.009) (0.183) (0.020) (0.022) (0.015)
2 years after 0.039 -0.008 0.039 -0.156 0.009 0.009 0.051
(0.022) (0.026) (0.024) (0.142) (0.020) (0.037) (0.049)
Age of participant 0.003 0.003*** 0.001* 0.072 0.000 0.003 0.009**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.066) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Age squared -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Islamic Dummy -0.008 -0.016 0.001 -0.224 -0.008 -0.025** -0.039*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.217) (0.009) (0.009) (0.017)
Female Dummy -0.011*** -0.006 -0.014*** 0.067 -0.005 -0.018** -0.025**
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.062) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009)
Education -0.001 -0.003 0.000 -0.049 -0.002 0.001 -0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.046) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
Number of 
children (<6) 0.001 -0.004* 0.005* 0.024 -0.000 -0.002 0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.037) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008)
Number of 
children in school 
(6-11) 0.001 -0.000 0.003* -0.127 0.001 -0.002 0.004
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.125) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Credit Availability 0.026*** 0.025** 0.006 0.086 0.021** 0.036*** 0.095***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.078) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012)
Constant -0.027 -0.021 -0.008 -0.941 0.008 -0.030 -0.095
(0.034) (0.014) (0.009) (0.954) (0.012) (0.030) (0.065)
Observations 2,365 2,354 2,354 2,365 2,344 2,354 2,327
R-squared 0.012 0.011 0.014 0.006 0.009 0.019 0.046
Number of branch 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1








2 years before 0.004
(0.029)
1 year before 0.028
(0.032)
Year of take-up 0.031
(0.025)
1 year after 0.053
(0.036)
2 years after 0.055
(0.043)






















Number of branch 8
Number of years 0
R-squared 0.115
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3: OLS Region Fixed Effects 




















2 years before 0.011 0.008 -0.016* 0.004 0.003 0.002
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.020)
1 year before 0.028** -0.015** -0.009 -0.002 0.017 0.016
(0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.002) (0.011) (0.019)
Year of take-up 0.039*** 0.011 -0.009 0.005 -0.001 0.037*
(0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.022)
1 year after 0.008 0.005 -0.043*** 0.000 0.004 -0.025
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.005) (0.008) (0.026)
2 years after 0.015 -0.010 -0.009 -0.001 0.009 0.006
(0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.001) (0.010) (0.026)
Age of participant 0.003*** 0.001 0.001 0.002** 0.001 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Age squared -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Islamic Dummy -0.004 0.000 -0.014** -0.006* -0.008 -0.025*
(0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.008) (0.014)
Female Dummy -0.011 -0.005 0.004 -0.007* -0.015* -0.024
(0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.014)
Education 0.004* 0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.002** 0.004
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Number of children 
(<6) 0.000 0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Number of children in 
school (6-11) -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.007*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
Credit Availability -0.011* -0.001 0.008 0.009 -0.001 0.004
(0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007)
Constant -0.033* -0.000 0.007 -0.026** -0.006 -0.054
(0.018) (0.014) (0.023) (0.012) (0.013) (0.037)
Observations 2,398 2,398 2,398 2,398 2,398 2,398
R-squared 0.014 0.007 0.011 0.008 0.011 0.012
Number of Region-Year 88 88 88 88 88 88
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1



















2 years before 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.011 0.007 0.018
(0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.014) (0.019)
1 year before -0.014** 0.001 0.004 -0.009 -0.000 -0.005
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.018) (0.020)
Year of take-up -0.003 0.003 -0.001 -0.006 -0.001 0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.017) (0.016)
1 year after 0.004 0.001 -0.004 -0.015** -0.022 -0.009
(0.011) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.015) (0.021)
2 years after -0.013 -0.004 0.008 0.004 0.036 0.035
(0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.016) (0.023) (0.028)
Age of participant -0.000 0.002** 0.001* 0.002** -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Age squared -0.000 -0.000** -0.000** -0.000* 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Islamic Dummy -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.011 -0.019*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010)
Female Dummy -0.004 -0.013** 0.000 -0.005 -0.001 -0.010
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012)
Education -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002* 0.000 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Number of children (<6) 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
Number of children in 
school (6-11) -0.003** 0.000 0.003 0.000 -0.004 -0.005
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Credit Availability 0.001 0.002 0.005 -0.001 -0.012 -0.011
(0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012)
Constant 0.022 -0.011 -0.014 -0.013 0.062 0.061
(0.023) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.039) (0.039)
Observations 2,365 2,365 2,365 2,365 2,343 2,365
R-squared 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.005
Number of Region-Year 88 88 88 88 88 88
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4B: OLS Region-Year Fixed Effects on Home Improvement Projects
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES








2 years before 0.009 -0.021 -0.008 0.033 -0.020** -0.007 -0.038*
(0.015) (0.014) (0.009) (0.059) (0.008) (0.011) (0.021)
1 year before -0.040*** -0.006 -0.010 -0.080 -0.016 -0.008 -0.043*
(0.013) (0.019) (0.008) (0.068) (0.010) (0.013) (0.025)
Year of take-up 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.803 -0.020 -0.028** -0.014
(0.020) (0.018) (0.009) (0.802) (0.013) (0.014) (0.025)
1 year after -0.001 0.003 0.010 -0.405 -0.023 0.012 -0.004
(0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.413) (0.019) (0.025) (0.024)
2 years after 0.022 -0.038** 0.003 -0.228 -0.009 -0.010 -0.013
(0.027) (0.017) (0.013) (0.230) (0.020) (0.023) (0.034)
Age of participant 0.003* 0.003* 0.001 0.078 -0.000 0.003 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.076) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Age squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Islamic Dummy -0.002 -0.011 0.000 -0.180 -0.004 -0.019** -0.030**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.165) (0.006) (0.009) (0.014)
Female Dummy -0.011 -0.006 -0.014** 0.074 -0.004 -0.016* -0.022
(0.011) (0.009) (0.006) (0.085) (0.007) (0.009) (0.017)
Education -0.001 -0.003 0.000 -0.051 -0.002 0.001 -0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.048) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Number of children (<6) -0.000 -0.005 0.003 0.022 -0.002 -0.005 -0.006
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.030) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007)
Number of children in 
school (6-11) 0.002 0.000 0.004 -0.116 0.001 -0.002 0.007
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.118) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
Credit Availability -0.018 -0.014 -0.008 0.135 -0.008 0.005 -0.010
(0.016) (0.014) (0.005) (0.158) (0.005) (0.007) (0.021)
Constant 0.008 0.016 0.008 -1.029 0.042** 0.000 0.006
(0.027) (0.026) (0.011) (1.149) (0.020) (0.029) (0.046)
Observations 2,365 2,354 2,354 2,365 2,344 2,354 2,327
R-squared 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.009
Number of Region-Year 88 88 88 88 88 88 88
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1








2 years before 0.002
(0.027)
1 year before 0.007
(0.027)
Year of take-up 0.003
(0.029)
1 year after -0.013
(0.026)
2 years after -0.030
(0.027)








Number of children (<6) 0.021***
(0.008)











Number of Region-Year 88
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4D: OLS Region-Year Fixed-
Effects on Private School
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2 years before 0.012 -0.004 0.004 -0.006 -0.028*** -0.012 -0.063**
(0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.024)
1 year before 0.028* 0.011 0.008 -0.007 -0.011 -0.001 -0.029
(0.014) (0.024) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.023) (0.032)
Year of take-up 0.032* 0.018 0.009 -0.008 -0.028* -0.013 -0.015
(0.016) (0.025) (0.010) (0.008) (0.014) (0.017) (0.036)
1 year after 0.003 -0.032 -0.002 -0.002 -0.019 -0.019 -0.010
(0.013) (0.032) (0.010) (0.014) (0.016) (0.030) (0.024)
2 years after 0.007 0.012 0.018 0.020 -0.032 -0.029 -0.057
(0.017) (0.036) (0.021) (0.020) (0.026) (0.034) (0.041)
Age of participant 0.003*** 0.007*** 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.003 0.009***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Age squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Islamic Dummy -0.008 -0.035** -0.000 -0.001 -0.010 -0.026*** -0.042**
(0.006) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.017)
Female Dummy -0.011 -0.024 -0.000 -0.014** -0.003 -0.016* -0.021
(0.008) (0.014) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.017)
Education 0.004* 0.004 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.005
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Number of children (<6) 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.006
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007)
Number of children in 
school (6-11) -0.003 -0.007* 0.003 0.004 0.001 -0.002 0.008
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
Credit Availability -0.010** 0.008 0.003 -0.008 -0.005 0.007 -0.005
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.022)
2 years before * Islamic 
Dummy -0.004 0.017 0.002 -0.006 0.023 0.013 0.072
(0.021) (0.029) (0.020) (0.005) (0.017) (0.022) (0.053)
1 year before * Islamic 
Dummy -0.001 0.016 -0.014 -0.007 -0.015 -0.019 -0.039
(0.022) (0.038) (0.012) (0.009) (0.017) (0.034) (0.056)
Year of take-up * 
Islamic Dummy 0.020 0.057 -0.029* 0.029 0.023 -0.043** 0.007
(0.032) (0.040) (0.016) (0.022) (0.021) (0.017) (0.058)
1 year after * Islamic 
Dummy 0.017 0.022 -0.009 0.035 -0.010 0.095 0.020
(0.027) (0.043) (0.011) (0.028) (0.034) (0.058) (0.067)
2 years after * Islamic 
Dummy 0.025 -0.015 -0.030 -0.048** 0.066* 0.054 0.127*
(0.027) (0.049) (0.022) (0.021) (0.038) (0.044) (0.069)
Constant -0.034* -0.054 -0.013 0.008 0.041* -0.003 0.002
(0.018) (0.037) (0.015) (0.012) (0.021) (0.029) (0.045)
Observations 2,398 2,398 2,365 2,354 2,344 2,354 2,327
R-squared 0.016 0.013 0.010 0.015 0.010 0.016 0.013
Number of Region-Year 88 88 88 88 88 88 88
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6: OLS Region-Year Fixed-Effects on Selected Investments
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1 year before 0.028** -0.011** -0.009 -0.001 0.016 0.019
(0.012) (0.006) (0.011) (0.003) (0.011) (0.019)
2 years before 0.010 0.010 -0.017* 0.004 0.003 -0.000
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.008) (0.015)
Year of take-up 0.043*** 0.014 -0.012 0.011 -0.002 0.043*
(0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.007) (0.005) (0.023)
1 year after 0.012 0.007 -0.049*** 0.000 0.005 -0.027
(0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.005) (0.008) (0.024)
2 years after 0.015 -0.009 -0.021 0.000 0.009 -0.004
(0.014) (0.011) (0.024) (0.007) (0.010) (0.030)
Age of participant 0.010*** 0.008*** -0.004 0.003* 0.002 0.017
(0.003) (0.003) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013)
Age squared -0.000** -0.000** -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of 
children (<6) 0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.002 -0.000 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007)
Number of 
children in school 
(6-11) -0.003 -0.007** -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.009
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007)
Credit Availability -0.006 -0.002 0.006 0.009 0.002 0.011
(0.011) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.017)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.171*** -0.142*** 0.143 -0.027 -0.041 -0.216
(0.055) (0.050) (0.332) (0.032) (0.038) (0.338)
Observations 2,398 2,398 2,398 2,398 2,398 2,398
R-squared 0.131 0.107 0.119 0.099 0.119 0.167
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6: OLS Household-Level Fixed-Effects on Business Investments
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2 years before 0.012 -0.004 0.004 -0.006 -0.028*** -0.012 -0.063**
(0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.024)
1 year before 0.028* 0.011 0.008 -0.007 -0.011 -0.001 -0.029
(0.014) (0.024) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.023) (0.032)
Year of take-up 0.032* 0.018 0.009 -0.008 -0.028* -0.013 -0.015
(0.016) (0.025) (0.010) (0.008) (0.014) (0.017) (0.036)
1 year after 0.003 -0.032 -0.002 -0.002 -0.019 -0.019 -0.010
(0.013) (0.032) (0.010) (0.014) (0.016) (0.030) (0.024)
2 years after 0.007 0.012 0.018 0.020 -0.032 -0.029 -0.057
(0.017) (0.036) (0.021) (0.020) (0.026) (0.034) (0.041)
Age of participant 0.003*** 0.007*** 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.003 0.009***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Age squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Islamic Dummy -0.008 -0.035** -0.000 -0.001 -0.010 -0.026*** -0.042**
(0.006) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.017)
Female Dummy -0.011 -0.024 -0.000 -0.014** -0.003 -0.016* -0.021
(0.008) (0.014) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.017)
Education 0.004* 0.004 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.005
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Number of children (<6) 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.006
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007)
Number of children in 
school (6-11) -0.003 -0.007* 0.003 0.004 0.001 -0.002 0.008
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
Credit Availability -0.010** 0.008 0.003 -0.008 -0.005 0.007 -0.005
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.022)
2 years before * Islamic 
Dummy -0.004 0.017 0.002 -0.006 0.023 0.013 0.072
(0.021) (0.029) (0.020) (0.005) (0.017) (0.022) (0.053)
1 year before * Islamic 
Dummy -0.001 0.016 -0.014 -0.007 -0.015 -0.019 -0.039
(0.022) (0.038) (0.012) (0.009) (0.017) (0.034) (0.056)
Year of take-up * 
Islamic Dummy 0.020 0.057 -0.029* 0.029 0.023 -0.043** 0.007
(0.032) (0.040) (0.016) (0.022) (0.021) (0.017) (0.058)
1 year after * Islamic 
Dummy 0.017 0.022 -0.009 0.035 -0.010 0.095 0.020
(0.027) (0.043) (0.011) (0.028) (0.034) (0.058) (0.067)
2 years after * Islamic 
Dummy 0.025 -0.015 -0.030 -0.048** 0.066* 0.054 0.127*
(0.027) (0.049) (0.022) (0.021) (0.038) (0.044) (0.069)
Constant -0.034* -0.054 -0.013 0.008 0.041* -0.003 0.002
(0.018) (0.037) (0.015) (0.012) (0.021) (0.029) (0.045)
Observations 2,398 2,398 2,365 2,354 2,344 2,354 2,327
R-squared 0.016 0.013 0.010 0.015 0.010 0.016 0.013
Number of Region-Year 88 88 88 88 88 88 88
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7: OLS Region-Year Fixed-Effects on Selected Investments
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Appendix:  
II. Religion Index 
The survey conducted also includes questions regarding the level of religiosity of the 
participants. Such questions include asking if the participants read the Qur’an, and if so, 
how often. Other questions were incorporated in the survey, such as “Do you prefer to 
send your children to religious school”, “Do you support microfinance institutions to 
charge interest rates”, and “Do you often seek advice with a sheikh”. An index based on 
6 religion questions was created using summary index. However, the index variable is 
found to be non-significant, and does not change the results of the regression. Thus, the 
researcher has decided to keep the variable out of the model.  
 
 
 
 
